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The Pleading Problem in Antitrust
Cases and Beyond
Herbert Hovenkamp
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court held that a
complaint alleging an anticompetitive agreement failed to state a claim
because its allegations did not include enough “factual matter” to justify
proceeding to discovery.1 Two years later, the Supreme Court clarified that
the new pleading standard set forth in Twombly was not limited to antitrust
claims but applied to civil litigation generally.2
Twombly involved an allegation of anticompetitive conduct in violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Specifically, the prosecution alleged a
nationwide geographic market-division agreement—a cartel in which
members eliminate competition among themselves not by fixing the price,
but rather by dividing the market into exclusive territories.3 The prosecution
alleged the following facts in support of this agreement: (1) the four
dominant telephone companies, or Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers
(“ILECs”), did not expand into one another’s geographic territories even
though they were legally entitled to do so;4 (2) each of the defendants
vigorously excluded or limited the growth of competing telephone
companies in their respective territories; and (3) the CEO of Qwest
Communications, one of the four defendants, had once stated that
competing in the territory of another defendant “‘“might be a good way to

 Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, The University of Iowa College of Law.
1. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (to the extent it is relevant, the
author was consulted by a defendant).
2. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
3. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551 (noting allegations that the defendants conspired to avoid
competing with one another by not expanding into contiguous territories).
4. The seven original ILECs came into existence as a result of an antitrust consent decree
that broke up the old telephone monopoly. See Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983);
United States v. AT&T Co. (Modification of Final Judgment), 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982),
aff’d mem. sub nom. Under the decree, these “Baby Bells” were forbidden from competing in one
another’s territories. The territorial restriction was removed in the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Pub. Law No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 271 (2006)). By the time of
this litigation, some of the original ILECs had merged, and only four independent firms
remained. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550 n.1 (describing the 1984 dissolution of AT&T’s
monopoly).
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turn a quick dollar but that doesn’t make it right.”’”5 Both allegations (1)
and (2) were alleged to be “parallel” conduct, meaning that all the
defendants engaged in the activities. The only evidence of any “mental state”
suggesting an agreement, however, was the statement set forth in allegation
(3). The agreement allegedly spanned many years during a time when the
telecommunications industry underwent major changes. Discovery would
have been very costly for the defendants and was further complicated by the
nature of the telecommunications market—it is a network industry in which
inter-firm communication is essential to maintaining network
interoperability. As a result, the fact finder would have had to sort out
harmful from harmless or beneficial communications to ascertain whether
an actionable anticompetitive agreement in fact existed.
Kevin Clermont and Stephen C. Yeazell make a strong case that
Twombly’s effect, coupled with the Supreme Court’s subsequent Iqbal
decision, is far reaching. They argue that the two decisions operate to deny
judicial access to worthy litigants and that the effect of their broad reach and
lack of clarity has “destabilized the entire system of civil litigation.”6 A
plaintiff must now “plead facts and even some evidence.”7 Further, the
pleading of facts must be “particularized” in the sense that the pleading is
sufficient to “make plausible an inference of liability.”8 As a result, they
conclude, “the plaintiff who needs discovery to learn the required factual
particulars is the person whom the Court has newly put in jeopardy.”9 The
two Supreme Court decisions “ask whether inferring liability is ‘plausible’ in
light of the facts nonconclusorily pled—that is, whether it is a ‘reasonable
inference.’”10 This “appears equivalent to the standard of decision for
summary judgment . . . .”11 Indeed, they conclude that “the most startling
aspect of Twombly and Iqbal is that they call for a judge to weigh likelihood
without any evidential basis and with scant procedural protections,
effectively creating a civil procedure hitherto foreign to our fundamental
procedural principles . . . .”12
The Court could have avoided these startling consequences, which
result from its discussion about the detail that plaintiffs must provide in
federal complaints generally. As Iqbal illustrates, Twombly’s approach leads to
a great deal of confusion and—in antitrust at least—has produced prolix

5.
6.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550 (quoting Richard Notebaert, ILEC Qwest’s CEO).
Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA
L. REV. 821, 821, 823 (2010); see also Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010) (describing Twombly’s potential harm to litigants in civil litigation).
7. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 6, at 830.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 833 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)).
11. Id.
12. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 6, at 834.
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complaints sometimes running to more than one-hundred pages. What
pleading reform requires is not so much an increase in “factual matter” as
much as a closer correlation between the legal elements that plaintiffs must
prove and the allegations in a complaint.
Twombly would have been much less unsettling had it focused less on
pleading standards and more on the nature of proof required to establish
antitrust conspiracies. The Court almost certainly would have reached the
same result that it did13 and would not have done the damage to the notice
pleading system that Clermont and Yeazell lament.14
The pleading requirements articulated in Twombly contrast sharply with
sample pleadings in the Appendix of Forms that accompany the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. For example, Form 11 provides that the following
is a sufficient allegation: that on a given date and street “defendant
negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was then crossing said
highway”; as a result, “plaintiff was . . . injured . . . .”15 While the Form 11
pleading alleges a specific date and place, it is starkly conclusory with respect
to the legal violation. In tort law, the term “negligence” refers to specific acts
or omissions that a reasonable person would not do.16 In this negligent
driving example, the specific act could be speeding, failure to yield, failure
to have an unobstructed view, failure to have headlights turned on after dark
or windshield wiper blades running, and the like. The drafters of Form 11
were apparently satisfied with a generalized allegation of “negligence,” even
if the plaintiff knew what the particular act of negligence was and could have
set this out in the pleading. Allowing generalized allegations can yield
strategic pleadings in situations where the plaintiff deliberately fails to plead
what it knows. But requiring only a generalized allegation can also yield a
reasonable balance between allegation and fact finding in cases where the
defendant knows the particular acts but the plaintiff does not. The plaintiff
who was knocked unconscious by the collision, for example, knows that she
was walking lawfully with the light and that the defendant could have hit her
for a number of different reasons, one of which will come out in discovery.
Requiring the plaintiff to plead the specific act of negligence, rather than a

13. Clermont and Yeazell express some doubts on this proposition. See id. at 836
(suggesting that the Twombly complaint may have been sufficient to state a section 1
agreement).
14. See id. (explaining that such an alternative regime would reduce the current frequency
of weakly founded suits).
15. FED. R. CIV. P. FORM 11, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/cvforms2.htm.
16. Under some doctrines, such as res ipsa loquitur, negligence can be inferred from
other circumstances, but res ipsa would not govern a claim of driver negligence and, in any
event, is not being alleged in Form 11. See Byrne v. Boadle, (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Exch.) (a
plaintiff struck by barrel of flour that fell from window ledge need not show a specific act of
negligence; one could reasonably infer that flour would not have fallen in the absence of
negligence); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS §§ 7.3–7.5 (1999) (discussing the historical
development of res ipsa loquitur and related issues in proving negligence).
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generalized allegation is problematic, as this example demonstrates, where
the plaintiff is unable to discover the specific unlawful conduct until later.
Twombly’s facts pose concerns analogous to the negligent driving
example above. Naked market-division conspiracies must be kept secret by
the parties to the agreement because antitrust enforcers will prosecute them
when they are detected—potentially producing criminal liability.17 This
inherent secrecy, which the Twombly opinion did not discuss, has dire
consequences for plaintiffs under a standard that requires them to plead all
essential facts with specificity. Indeed, such secrecy can close the door to
prosecution in cases where the defendant’s behavior demonstrates a possible
or likely conspiracy, but all specific supporting evidence has not already
been uncovered by other means.
Prior to Twombly, the Supreme Court as well as lower courts had
frequently recognized and addressed the problem that secrecy poses from a
pleading standpoint. They permitted the inference of antitrust conspiracies
from acts falling short of explicit communication of an unlawful agreement.
The Twombly majority, however, said this about the plaintiff’s complaint:
Apart from identifying a seven–year span in which the § 1 violations
were supposed to have occurred (i.e., “[b]eginning at least as early
as February 6, 1996, and continuing to the present,”), . . . the
pleadings mentioned no specific time, place, or person involved in the
alleged conspiracies. This lack of notice contrasts sharply with the
model form for pleading negligence, Form 9 . . . .18 Whereas the
model form alleges that the defendant struck the plaintiff with his
car while plaintiff was crossing a particular highway at a specified
date and time, the complaint here furnishes no clue as to which of the four
ILECs (much less which of their employees) supposedly agreed, or when and
where the illicit agreement took place. A defendant wishing to prepare
an answer in the simple fact pattern laid out in Form 9 would know
what to answer; a defendant seeking to respond to plaintiffs’
conclusory allegations in the § 1 context would have little idea
where to begin.19
The Court’s discussion of perceived deficiencies in the complaint
suggests a narrower view of the evidence that plaintiffs can use to establish
an antitrust conspiracy under the Sherman Act.20 In the paradigm cartel
17. 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 2030–31 (2d ed. 2005).
18. Here, the Court refers to Form 9. It is important to note that subsequent to Twombly,
the Court enlarged and renumbered the list of forms. Form 9 is now Form 11. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 (2007).
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. On this point, see William H. Page, Twombly and Communication: The Emerging
Definition of Agreement Under the New Pleading Standards, 5 COMPETITION L. & ECON. 439, 444–46
(2009) (suggesting that the impact of Twombly is to require plaintiffs to show actual
communications among alleged conspirators). Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
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case, the defendants meet secretly in a hotel room and plot prices or output.
Alleging this conduct in a pleading likely fits within the narrower evidence
Twombly requires to prove a conspiracy. But antitrust conspiracies often do
not involve such explicit agreements, and liability for unlawful agreements
has not typically hinged upon pleading the paradigmatic cartel case. Rather,
antitrust agreements can ordinarily be proven by other evidence, including
evidence of interdependence, parallel behavior, and actions contrary to
independent self-interest.21 By indicating that the complaint failed because
it did not state “which of their employees” may have conspired and “when”
or “where” the agreement took place, the Twombly Court required the
plaintiff to plead something in its claim that existing law did not require it to
show in order to avoid summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law at
trial. In altering the pleading standards, the Court concurrently changed the
substantive conspiracy doctrine as well.
To illustrate, in High Fructose the Seventh Circuit, speaking through
Judge Posner, denied summary judgment after finding a conspiracy
plausible on the basis of structural evidence and regression analysis
examining prices and fluctuations in market share.22 Similarly, several lower
court decisions have permitted conspiracy claims to go forward on the basis
of statistical evidence of “incumbency” rates.23 The theory behind permitting
this evidence to establish a conspiracy is that customers in a competitive
market for a fungible product routinely shop among sellers. As a result, in
the absence of long-term contracts, one would expect to see fairly unstable
and shifting seller-customer pairings. By contrast, cartels typically “assign”
customers to cartel members, creating relationships that are much more
stable.24 So one would expect to see incumbency rates (stable buyer-seller

which prohibits unfair methods of competition, arguably reaches more broadly. See Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2010) (manuscript at 8), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531
136.
21. On the various approaches, see 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript ¶¶ 1431–36, on file with author).
22. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002)
(discussing the problem of multicollinearity in regression analyses).
23. See, e.g., City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 570–73 (11th Cir.
1998) (discussing that the high incumbency rate on new contracts is inconsistent with
independent action); State ex rel. Montgomery v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., No. C-1-93-553, 1996
WL 343440 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 26, 1996) (same); see Gregory J. Werden, Economic Evidence on the
Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 719, 759–
65 (2004) (arguing that the present state of the law is unsatisfactory because neither courts nor
many economists have grounded their analysis in modern oligopoly theory).
24. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, ¶ 1420(b) (discussing that a cartel or market
division scheme typically “reserves” customers for specific cartel members and how this
relationship can demonstrate or provide evidence of a conspiracy).
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pairings) increase when a cartel is formed and decrease when the cartel falls
apart and competition breaks out.25
None of this should be taken as a defense for any particular method of
proving a conspiracy as the validity of these alternative methodologies for
proving a conspiracy were not an issue before the Court. It is only an
observation that the Court in Twombly was drawing some pretty substantive
conclusions about what must go into a complaint to prove a conspiracy.
Twombly style proof-of-agreement cases are common in antitrust
litigation. Importantly, the Court did not purport to overrule older decisions
that found conspiracies yet lacked the elements required by Twombly.26 Proof
of agreement in an antitrust case can proceed along several routes. The
typical cartel case in which proof of agreement becomes an issue is pricefixing. In many of these cases, prices move together in a suspiciously parallel
fashion, or the firms simultaneously introduce or withdraw product offerings
or abandon markets,27 but there is no real evidence, or only inconclusive
evidence, of explicit communications among the parties. The cases are pled
against a legal background saying that “conscious parallelism” is not an
agreement, mainly because firms can be expected to follow and match one
another’s prices.28 So one must have more. The question is: how much more
must be alleged and eventually proven?
The most explicit evidence that a conspiracy exists is actual, observed
communications among firms. For example, wiretaps or informants might
produce evidence of actual discussions setting a price or reducing output.29
When such communications are lacking—or more typically, when they are
sufficiently thin that corroborating evidence is necessary—then agreements
can be inferred from other circumstances. This requires interdependence
plus some additional evidence of assent.

25. That proposition can be tested empirically.
26. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946) (inferring
agreement from price movements); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275 (1942)
(finding sufficient evidence of agreement in absence of any evidence of communication among
the agreeing parties); Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 474 (1939) (same); see
also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 574–76 (1986) (refusing to
find a conspiracy from parallel behavior where other evidence suggested that the alleged
conspiracy would have been implausible and granting summary judgment).
27. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 215–17 (exhibiting a simultaneous increase in
admission prices and abandonment of double features). For a recent application of Interstate
Circuit, see generally Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000) (applying Interstate
Circuit to an agreement among toy manufacturers to sell to discount clubs only in large
packages).
28. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, ¶¶ 1428–31 (analyzing parallel behavior).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2000) (involving use
of both wiretap evidence and informant to establish price fixing).
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“Interdependence” is a critical first step in inferring an agreement from
parallel behavior where evidence of explicit communication is lacking.30
Importantly, interdependence is not the same thing as parallel conduct,
although one passage in the Twombly opinion seems to presume otherwise.31
“Interdependence” refers to a subset of conduct that is parallel because it
results from one firm’s observation of other firms’ behavior and
anticipations about those firms’ reactions. For example, if market prices are
publicly known, the product is fairly fungible, and customers can quickly
switch among brands, then prices are likely to move in parallel fashion. This
is true of retail gasoline, where the stores post their price on a sign visible
not only to passing motorists but also to nearby rivals. It is also true of the
airlines, where prices are posted on websites, and both travel agents and
consumers have virtually instant access to them. This “conscious parallelism”
is not the same thing as an agreement, however, because there is no offer
and acceptance. When the prices of four nearby gasoline stations or four
airlines move up and down in tandem, the most we can infer is that one firm
changed its price and the others individually decided to go along.
Moreover, conduct might be parallel for no other reason than that the
firms are responding to the same external stimulus. In such cases, they may
behave in parallel fashion without reacting to what their rivals are doing or,
indeed, without even knowing what their rivals are up to. For example, upon
reading or hearing a report of an early frost, thousands of farmers might
decide to harvest a crop early. Or upon hearing a prediction of a recession,
many manufacturers might decide not to increase their output for the
coming year. That is to say, the mere fact that firms are rational profit
maximizers in the same market implies that they will do a fair number of
things in parallel fashion. Farmers switched from horses to tractors and
airlines from propeller to jet aircraft not because of cartels, but because
differences in performance justified those changes, and firms that did not
switch would have lost out.
Most instances of “parallel” conduct are best described in this way. Why
do most automobile manufacturers permit their dealers to sell only a single
brand? Why do most computer manufacturers sell computers with hard
drives preinstalled? Why do most fast-food franchises offer soft drinks as well
as food? In all of these cases, the first inference to be drawn is not that the
firms are conspiring with each other, but that competition, consumer
preference, or market conditions have forced them to behave in a similar
way. In that case, the new computer manufacturer who decides that its
30. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, ¶ 1411 (discussing the relationship of
interdependence to agreement).
31. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007) (“The inadequacy of showing
parallel conduct or interdependence, without more, mirrors the ambiguity of the behavior:
consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and
competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market.”).
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product will be most appealing to consumers if hard drives are preinstalled
is not “conspiring” with rival computer makers. Rather, the manufacturer is
acting in its independent best interest given the state of consumer
preference in that market.
The conduct alleged in the Twombly complaint was parallel, but not
interdependent. Indeed, one important fact about Twombly is that, while it
was a proof-of-agreement case, the claim was geographic market division
rather than parallel pricing. For all of its lengthy discussion about the facts
essential to a good complaint, the Supreme Court paid little attention to the
difference between price fixing and market division.
The complaint alleged that the defendants had conspired to exclude all
new entrants from their historical territories by engaging in various activities
such as making unfair agreements with new entrants, providing them with
inferior network connections, overcharging them, and trying to sabotage
them in other ways.32 As the Court observed, however, every firm that is
dominant in its own market has an incentive to try to exclude rivals.33 As a
result, the fact that each firm behaved this way hardly indicated a marketdivision conspiracy—the acts would have been profitable for each firm
whether or not the others were doing them as well. The Court echoed the
district court’s conclusion that “the behavior of each ILEC in resisting the
incursion of CLECs is fully explained by the ILEC’s own interests in
defending its individual territory.”34
Once we have concluded that parallel behavior is not merely a response
to the same stimulus but also an interdependent response, we then must look
for other factors creating an inference of agreement.35 This analysis is
objective, just as it typically is in the tort law of negligence. The question,
therefore, is not so much whether a “meeting of the minds” in the commonlaw contract sense existed as whether these are types of behavior that the law
should suppress. In the presence of interdependence, which is a potentially
dangerous condition, communications among rivals about planned output
changes increase the danger of collusion. Absent justifications, we condemn
them by finding a Sherman Act agreement.

32. Id. at 550–51; see, e.g., Verizon Comm’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
540 U.S. 398, 403–05 (2004) (detailing some of ILEC Verizon’s efforts to limit the growth of an
interconnecting rival).
33. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566 (stating that “resisting competition is routine market
conduct”).
34. Id. at 552 (quoting the district court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 313 F. Supp. 2d
174, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
35. In reversing the district court and reinstating the complaint, the Second Circuit simply
assumed that the conduct was interdependent and that “plus factors” were evidence and not
essential to the pleadings. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005) rev’d, 550
U.S. 544 (2007).
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Parallel pricing raises an inference of interdependence and perhaps
even a degree of implied cooperation among the firms.36 While parallel
pricing alone is not generally sufficient to prove an agreement,37 it is
enough to raise our antennae. This provokes a search for other things,
inelegantly referred to as “plus factors,”38 that enable the leap from merely
parallel prices to agreed parallel prices. These plus factors can include
explicit communications, but they can also include things like incumbency
rates,39 highly suspicious behavior, the use of “facilitating” practices that
serve to make collusion easier, or other actions that are generally contrary to
the self interest of the actors, except on the assumption that they are acting
in concert.40 Proving some of these factors requires an expert and the use of
statistics. As a result, if Twombly requires that plus factors be pled, drafting of
a good faith complaint may require engagement of an expert and at least a
preliminary factual inquiry. In some cases, of course, the data that an expert
needs can be obtained only in discovery.
A complaint alleging that the defendants moved their prices up and
down sequentially in lockstep fashion and a market structure conducive to
collusion, coupled with some observations of relevant communication
among the parties, would remain sufficient under Twombly’s formulation.
36. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, ¶¶ 1432 (describing interdependent
pricing).
37. But see Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 804–08 (1946) (inferring
agreement almost exclusively from price movements).
38. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, ¶¶ 1430–34; see, e.g., Merck-Medco Managed
Care v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 98-2847, 1999 WL 691840, at *9 (4th Cir. Sept. 7, 1999). The court
stated:
In order to infer a conspiracy, conscious parallelism must be accompanied by “plus
factors.” While the Supreme Court has not recounted a list of plus factors,
numerous plus factors, such as “motive to conspire,” “opportunity to conspire,”
“high level of inter-firm communications,” irrational acts or acts contrary to a
defendant’s economic interest, but rational if the alleged agreement existed, and
departure from normal business practices, have been considered by other circuits.
Id.
39. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text (discussing incumbency rates).
40. Twombly did not discuss plus factors except for a brief mention suggesting that it
disagreed with the Second Circuit’s conclusion that plus factors need not be pled, although
they might be necessary to avoid summary judgment. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 553, 569 (2007). The Second Circuit held:
On a motion for summary judgment in a case involving alleged violations of
Section 1, “courts have held that a plaintiff must show the existence of additional
circumstances, often referred to as ‘plus’ factors, which, when viewed in
conjunction with the parallel acts, can serve to allow a fact-finder to infer a
conspiracy.” These “plus factors” may include: “a common motive to conspire,”
evidence that “shows that the parallel acts were against the apparent individual
economic self-interest of the alleged conspirators,” and evidence of “a high level of
interfirm communications . . . .”
Twombly, 425 F.3d at 114.
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These would constitute facts “plausibly suggesting” an agreement or raising a
“reasonable expectation”41 that discovery would reveal more, as many postTwombly decisions have held.42 In such cases, the appropriate message to be
taken from Twombly is that plaintiffs must research carefully and look at
objective evidence drawn from market and firm structure and behavior as
well as subjective evidence of statements, communications, and the like.
But Twombly was a market division case, and parallel failures to enter
one another’s markets do not create the same set of suspicions as parallel
pricing. If they did, the premise must be that absent agreements, everybody
would be selling everything everywhere. When one walks down the street
and sees a pet store that does not sell groceries and a grocery store that does
not sell puppies, no inference of a market division agreement comes to
mind. Nor is a cartel the likely explanation if Alpha owns a pizza place only
on the west side of town and Beta only on the east side, or the fact that a
lawyer does not practice medicine on the side while her neighbor, a
physician, does not practice law. As the Supreme Court observed in Twombly,

41. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545.
42. For examples of such decisions, see generally Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 592
F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2010) (allegations of price fixing of digital music sufficed under Twombly
when conduct was alleged to be irrational in the absence of an agreement); Urethane Antitrust
Litig., 663 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (D. Kan. 2009) (pleading of conspiracy sufficient under Twombly when
market was prone to collusion; price increase announcements were made in interrelated fashion;
and defendants participated in meetings at which prices were discussed); Korkala v. Allpro Imaging,
Inc., No. 08-2712, 2009 WL 2496506 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2009) (holding that the plaintiff adequately
alleged price fixing by manufacturers of X-ray film based on parallel price increases and numerous
meetings of sales managers at which the increases were discussed); Standard Iron Works v.
Arcelormittal USA, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 2d 877 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (Twombly permitted the claim that
domestic steel producers fixed prices, based mainly on allegation that they simultaneously reduced
output in the face of increasing demand—an act that would have been contrary to individual self
interest); Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 6423(LTS),
2009 WL 1457177 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2009) (the plaintiffs adequately alleged conspiracy among the
only two entities authenticating Andy Warhol art works based on suspicious parallel behavior in
certifying and then denying certification on various works, and inconsistent application of
authentication policies); Wanachek Mink Ranch v. Alaska Brokerage Int’l, Inc., No. C06-089RSM,
2009 WL 1342676 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 2009) (holding that mink ranchers adequately alleged
conspiracy of fur buyers to suppress mink fur prices, including bid rotation and lot allocation);
Hackman v. Dickerson Realtors, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 875 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (real estate broker
adequately alleged group boycott against him with claims that discussions were held at a real estate
association meeting pertaining to excluding him; and that representatives of a different agency told
him about a boycott); In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (plaintiffs adequately alleged agreement with claims that defendants manipulated their plant
production capacity in ways that did not make sense except on the premise of an agreement; that
there were numerous invitations to conspire followed by some responsive assurance; and pretextual
reasons given for price increases; however, complaint lacked sufficient allegations with respect to
specific defendants). See also In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. M 07-1827 SI, 2009 WL
533130 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2009) (finding that allegations in amended complaint with respect to
specific defendants were adequate); In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 593 F. Supp.
2d 29 (D.D.C. 2008) (plaintiffs adequately alleged that railroads fixed price by manipulating fuel
surcharges).
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firms “do not expand without limit.”43 Further, “none of them enters every
market that an outside observer might regard as profitable, or even a small
portion of such markets.”44 A firm’s decision to expand involves many
factors. First is the availability of capital and the question whether to expand
at all. Second is the selection of an expansion market, looking at costs, risks,
and expected payoffs given the anticipated responses from incumbents.
Chief Justice Roberts was on the right track in the oral argument when
he asked this question:
[W]ould it state an antitrust violation if had you a grocery store on
one corner of the block and a pet store on the other corner of the
block and you say, well, the grocery store is not selling pet supplies
and they could make money if they did, therefore that’s an
antitrust violation?45
The all-important question about Twombly is whether the plaintiffs ever
reached the first step in pleading an agreement. Did they allege that the
failure of several incumbent telephone companies to move outside of their
initially assigned geographic territories was interdependent conduct?46 The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants individually had the know-how to
expand and that expansion would have been profitable.47 But those
allegations could be made about almost any firm and hardly suggest
interdependence. Consider a pizza restaurateur on the west side of town and
another on the east side. Assuming that each one knows its business in its
own location, a reasonable inference is that they would know the business
on the other side of town as well. So they would have the know-how to enter.
We might also observe that others are entering the business on both sides of
town, as was the case in Twombly.48 The fact that entry is easy for these other
firms means that it must be easy for the two defendant firms as well. Further,
they have the experience advantage in that they are already running pizza
restaurants in their home locations.

43. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 (quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, ¶ 307d (Supp.
2006)).
44. Id.
45. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (No. 05-1126), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-1126.pdf.
46. On the initial assignments under the antitrust consent decree, see supra note 4.
47. Actually, the complaint alleged that the ILECs had complained repeatedly that the
Telecommunications Act required them to interconnect with CLECs at below cost, and that this
entailed that competitive entry as a CLEC would have been profitable. See Twombly v. Bell Atl.
Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 118 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing the Complaint ¶ 39). The allegation is a nonsequitur: the fact that a new entrant can purchase an input at below cost does not guarantee
that it will be profitable.
48. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 546 (noting that other firms were entering the markets as
CLECs).
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One might play this story on for a few more rounds, but the point
should be clear: reasoning of this sort turns ordinary competitive business
behavior into allegations of a conspiracy. And the world would contain
millions of them, provided that we accept the premise, which must be
something like “a firm will enter a different market any time it appears
profitable to do so, unless it is conspiring with a rival in that new market.”
In sum, the complaint in Twombly attempted to manufacture something
out of nothing. In the Twombly case even the injury must be inferred—that
is, an expert would postulate that prices would have been lower had the two
pizza restaurant owners built stores in one another’s territories. Indeed,
entry into a new market virtually always lowers prices unless someone else
reduces its output by an amount at least equal to the output of the new
entrant.
Twombly clearly reached the correct conclusion, but it could have done
less damage to the values of notice pleading stated in the Federal Rules had
it focused more narrowly on the mechanisms by which anticompetitive
agreements are proven.
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